Tattoo of a Terrorist

(VIEWER DISCRETION ADVISED)

At the bottom is a photograph (taken and released by Reuters) of the body of one of the terrorists involved in the failed terrorist attack on Peshawar Airbase in Pakistan on 15 December 2012, credit for which was immediately claimed by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) (notably before the photo was released). He was killed by Pakistani security forces in a firefight after being encircled during a search operation on 16 December 2012 in the vicinity of the Peshawar Airbase.

Religious Muslims (which the TTP claims to be) consider tattoos and the artistic depiction of the human and animal form to be un-Islamic. Yet this terrorist not only has tattoos, but tattoos depicting a satanic skull with multiple horns and a hand with long fingernails. The skull, let alone a satanic one, is a very un-Islamic art form and not one in vogue in predominantly Muslim countries like Pakistan. It goes without saying that tattoos are rare in Pakistan even among liberal Westernized Pakistanis, let alone religious ones. This begs the question: does this back, covered with satanic symbols, belong to an ideologically-driven religious Muslim fighting a Jihad?

A few years ago, a similar photograph was released by Pakistani authorities (now widely available on the Internet and too explicit to be reproduced on this blog) showing the naked body of a dead terrorist who was killed while fighting the Pakistan Army in Swat Valley. He had long hair and a long beard that made him look like a religious Muslim (or someone belonging Pakistan's tribal areas) but was, strangely, uncircumcised (circumcision is a mandatory religious obligation for all Muslim males before they reach puberty). A DNA test carried on his body by Pakistani intelligence revealed that he was a Gurkha, who are Hindus from the mid-western, eastern Nepal and the Gorkhaland region of India. Both the Indian and British armies enlist Gurkhas in elite fighting units in their respective armies.

Viewers may draw their own conclusions as to who these terrorists actually are; what their real objectives are; who their handlers are; and which ultimate beneficiaries/controllers are directing these terrorist attacks on Pakistan's high value defence assets through them. For those unaware, Peshawar Airbase houses two fighter squadrons of the Pakistan Air Force (PAF), including the first operationalized squadron of the PAF's JF-17 Thunder multi-role fighters, which, apparently, were the targets of the terrorists (see also this article).

Photo credit: Khuram Parvez/Reuters

Most Favoured Nation Status to India catastrophic for Pakistani Agriculture

Dr. Mohammad Tariq Bucha

The government has planned to grant the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status to India by the end of 2012. The farmers believe that such a basic shift in trade policy would require a significant amount of research and confidence of important stakeholders before working out specific modalities of liberalising trade relations with India.

Moreover, any such opening should occur in a phased and strategic manner to ensure that Pakistan’s agricultural and food security is not compromised. However, it is strange that the government is pursuing a reckless path to hasty trade liberalisation with India without consulting the farmers’ community.

Islamabad is currently maintaining a ‘negative list’ of over 1,000 items prohibited for import into Pakistan, but there is not a single agricultural item on this list. If approved by the federal cabinet by December 31, 2012, the ‘negative list’ will be replaced with a time-bound ‘sensitive list’ of about 100 goods with all other goods carrying 5 percent maximum tariff. The ‘sensitive list’ is likely to include only those items already on the ‘negative list’. Since there are no agricultural items on this list, this economically reckless oversight must be redressed.

The Pakistani farmers - small, medium and large - are of the opinion that a sudden liberalisation of trade with India, which ignores their legitimate interests and excludes agricultural goods from both the ‘negative’ and ‘sensitive’ lists, will prove to be suicidal for agriculture and ultimately the nation’s economy. It is in the interest of the government to give attention and support in the following context:

Pakistan must pursue a fair trade policy, rather than a hastily negotiated one-sided free trade regime with India. Agriculture should be forthwith removed from the ambit of this ill-planned trade regime.

India provides roughly $66 billion per annual subsidies to its agricultural sector. Pakistan’s entire GDP is roughly about $210 billion, and giving heavy subsidies to any sector will not be possible in the foreseeable future. Thus, agricultural goods must benefit from the protection of ‘negative’ and sensitive’ lists as well as technical regulations.

In India, a bag of urea sells for Rs 610; whereas in Pakistan, it is Rs 1,800 per bag. High Speed Diesel, a critical agriculture input, in India is priced at Rs 85 per litre against Rs 115 per litre in Pakistan. India also provides significant subsidies on indirect inputs such as electricity and seeds, both of which are almost free in India; whereas its rates in Pakistan have become extremely unaffordable. Pakistan also levies GST at 16 percent on all agriculture inputs, which are tax exempt in India. India’s average duty rate for agricultural goods is as high as 34 percent; whereas Pakistan’s average duty rate is half, i.e. as low as17 percent. Thus, India not only provides very large subsidies to help its farmers, but also erects high tariff barriers so that they are protected from competition, including agricultural exports from Pakistan. India maintains a minimum price support programme on 25 agricultural crops; whereas Pakistan has just one such agricultural crop, i.e wheat. Thus, the protection given by New Delhi to its agri-sector is significantly greater than Pakistan.

Even though India granted the MFN status to Pakistan in 1996, the balance of trade has heavily favoured it because it also imposed non-tariff and tariff barriers to deny access to Pakistani goods. Thus, Pakistan’s exports to India could not increase beyond $332 million since 1996-97; while on the other hand, even without being granted the MFN status, Indian exports to Pakistan have increased manifold, i.e. from $158 million to $2.0 billion during the same period. The ratio that was 80:20 in India’s favour now stands increased to 85:15. What more has been planned for Pakistan, is quite clear. Therefore, any knee-jerk and reckless opening of trade that does not protect our agriculture will favour India, even more to the detriment of the Pakistani economy.

In its negotiations with its Indian counterpart, the Pakistani team must insist that India lowers its tariffs on agricultural goods from Pakistan, which it can do bilaterally with respect to Pakistan, as per WTO rules.

Additionally, India has a myriad number of non-tariff barriers, which it imposes on goods that try and get access to the Indian market, particularly for agricultural goods. Before Pakistan grants the MFN status to India, it must demand that it remove most of its non-tariff barriers, which serve protectionist purposes.

High Indian subsidies and protectionist tariffs for agricultural goods would prevent Pakistani agricultural goods to be exported to India. We must include necessary agricultural goods in the current ‘negative’ and the planned ‘sensitive’ lists. If the agriculture sector is discriminated against by our own government in such a manner and not given the same protection given to industrial goods, it will force farmers to convert land to non-agricultural use leading to the closure of factories and shrinking markets. It will cause a total collapse of Pakistan’s economy with grave threat to its food security, thereby our sovereignty.

Liberalising trade with India through the Wagah route will inundate our smaller and more fragile markets. Farmers firmly believe that Pakistan and India should both benefit from a resumption of bilateral trade relations, but they support phased and measured trade liberalisation. But the cardinal principle that ‘mutually-beneficial bilateral trade must be fair in order to be truly free trade’ should not be ignored, which is enshrined in the WTO principles as well.

Any such change in policy must be transparent and be made in consultation with Pakistani farmers through different farming organisations, which are the major and important stakeholders of the agricultural sector in the country. Without a trade policy that affords protection to agriculture, granting the MFN status to India will be catastrophic for the tens of millions of people whose livelihood is based on agriculture. As is shown in the chart, India provides minimum support prices to 25 agricultural produce by an annual subsidy of $66 billion also.

The leaders in Islamabad need to wake up and not give away Pakistan’s food security and sovereignty just to please few vested interests. They must also take swift action to avert a situation that will lead to the devastation of our agriculture and economy.

The writer is the President of Farmers Associates Pakistan (FAP). E-mail: buchatariq@gmail.com

This article was published in 'The Nation' newspaper on 7 December 2012

Remembering Bhagat Singh, Forgetting Aurangzeb

It is regrettable, if not shameful, that not a single road in Lahore is named after the sixth Mughal Emperor, Abul Muzaffar Muhi-ud-Din Muhammad Aurangzeb (1618-1707), the man who gave Lahore (and possibly the land that is now Pakistan) its greatest, grandest and most beautiful architectural treasure, the Badshahi Mosque.

A historical opportunity to correct this omission was presented to the City District Government Lahore recently when it formed the “Dilkash Lahore Committee” to rename major roads, bridges and intersections in Lahore. However, it is regrettable that, on the recommendation of the Committee, 26 roads, bridges and intersections in Lahore have recently been renamed after important personalities of Pakistan and British India, yet not a single one of them has been renamed after Aurangzeb.

This seemingly blatant omission can only point towards the historical myopia of the members of the Committee that was constituted for this purpose. One can only hope that such omission was not deliberate but rather due to an oversight, reckless as it may be.

Those who were entrusted with the task of renaming of Lahore’s roads, bridges and intersections had a moral, historical and legal obligation to (i) take into account all considerations that ought to have been taken into account; (ii) exercise their discretion reasonably and; (ii) represent the aspirations of the majority of the residents of Lahore and not their own personal desires, biases, agendas and vested interests, if any.

Furthermore, giving the authority to decide the names of Lahore’s major roads, bridges and intersections to a select committee comprising only a handful of Lahore’s residents (without any public survey, poll or referendum) is tantamount to empowering a tiny fraction of Lahore’s residents (who may represent a particular viewpoint) with the right to decide for the vast majority of the city’s residents, who may hold a different viewpoint. Such exercise of discretion is arbitrary, unreasonable, discriminatory, unfair and non-judicious. There should be written and legally-binding guidelines for naming and renaming of public roads in Pakistan. If there aren’t any, there ought to be. If there are, then it should be examined if these are being complied with.

It may be pertinent to mention that the most expensive and prestigious road in New Delhi, the capital of India, is called “Aurangzeb Road,” i.e. after the Mughal Emperor. Indeed, one British newspaper called it “India’s richest road.” The Times of India referred to it as the road “paved with gold.” Such is its prominence. This is notwithstanding the fact that Emperor Aurangzeb is not very popular amongst a large section of the majority Hindu population of India (mostly due to demonization, historical misinterpretation and myths built up by communal, bigoted and revisionist Hindutva historians). Yet it goes to the credit of New Delhi's municipal authorities that they had the courage to accept and recognize historical realities and felt the need to honour and remember Emperor Aurangzeb by naming (and keeping) one of the major roads in their capital in his memory.

If New Delhi, in the Hindu-majority secular Republic of India, can honour Aurangzeb, so can Lahore, in the Muslim-majority Islamic Republic of Pakistan. If the City District Government Lahore can bend backwards to rename a chowk as Bhagat Singh Chowk (many residents of the Shadman locality have protested against renaming of Shadman Chowk as Bhagat Singh Chowk and some have even challenged the same in the Lahore High Court), then it can certainly find a major road in Lahore to rename after Aurangzeb.

A Silent Invasion

Asif Ezdi

In his appearance last Monday before the Supreme Court, Raja Pervaiz Ashraf sought some more time to deliberate on the issue of writing a letter to the Swiss authorities and assured the court that he would do his best to deal with it. “Mujh par vishvas karen” (trust me), the Prime Minister said, using an opaque Hindi word meaning trust, confidence, belief.

Raja’s use of Hindi in addressing the court was striking as well as jarring, given the fact that there are perfectly suitable Urdu words with the same meaning, not only those of Arabic origin – like yaqin and i’timad – but also indigenous ones like bharosa. Vishvas, on the contrary, is not one of the hundreds of thousands of words that are common to Urdu and Hindi, but has been given currency in India as a result of a campaign by Hindu nationalists to popularise or coin “authentic” local substitutes for “foreign” terms.

Raja’s choice of Hindi vocabulary would hardly merit comment, were it not for the fact that it is symptomatic of a creeping cultural penetration of Pakistan by our eastern neighbour, to which the government seems to be completely oblivious. This silent invasion is taking place mainly through the opening of Pakistan to cheap Bollywood movies, the airing of Indian TV’s entertainment programmes by our cable operators, the free availability of pirated DVDs and videos of Indian films on the local market and, most insidious of all, the home screening of popular children’s programmes, especially cartoons, dubbed in Hindi.

Young impressionable minds are the most vulnerable to this onslaught. But they are not the only ones. Raja hardly belongs to that category and even at his age he seems to have subconsciously imbibed Hindi vocabulary simply by watching too many of the Bollywood thrillers.

Most of these oeuvres offer little more than a standard fare of love triangles, scheming villains, melodramatic dialogue, “wet sari scenes and lots and lots of singing and dancing in alpine meadows” (Washington Post). and are devoid of any artistic or cultural merit. If someone chooses third-rate entertainment, it is of course a matter of individual choice. Where the state comes in is when the national interest or the fabric of society is threatened. From this point of view, there are three reasons why imports from Bollywood should be a matter of public concern.

First, these movies provide a generous serving of what a recent Associated Press story on Bollywood described delicately as “swelling songs, innervating rain storms, and jiggly dances” which transgress the bounds of decency and good decorum. The titillating scenes which are their main attraction promote vulgarity and obscenity, as the Supreme Court has remarked on a petition by concerned citizens. Because of lack of action by the government, the Supreme Court has now taken the matter in its hands. Although the airing of “obscene” material is prohibited, there is no definition of this term under the law. The court has asked Pemra to consult all interested parties to determine what amounts to “obscenity.” The case is still pending, but in the absence of a commitment by the government judicial action will not be enough.

Second, Indian movies increasingly portray such errant behaviour as steamy love affairs, promiscuity and marital infidelity as normal and acceptable. This tends to promote a culture of permissiveness in the society at large and should be a matter of concern to the state. Even Afghanistan, India’s strategic partner and one of the biggest foreign markets for Bollywood films, has had to draw a line, and in 2008 the government was forced by pressure from the parliament and the Shura-e-Ulema to order local television networks to stop broadcasting five Indian soap operas because they were not in keeping with “Afghan religion and culture.”

When the Musharraf regime lifted the ban on the import of Indian movies in February 2008, it gave the assurance that “religious and cultural norms and values” of the country would be protected. But this commitment has not been fulfilled. Since most Pakistani viewers watch pirated (and therefore uncensored) Indian movies at home, there is no way to ban unwanted films or to excise undesirable material, other than by penalising their illegal sale in the country. But this has never been done. The truth is that the government has an unwritten policy not to enforce its declared policy to ban Bollywood movies which are offensive to our values and culture.

Third, the home screening of pirated Indian films brings Indian culture and language right into our living rooms across all barriers of law and policy. As a result, our distinct way of life, values and language, which we have successfully preserved through the centuries in an alien and hostile environment, are being challenged as never before. Children and young people are particularly susceptible.

Typically, the government does not have any policy to counter this threat. It is perhaps not even alive to its existence. But it is not the government alone which has been remiss. The civil society, which is quick to take up causes dear to the West, and the political parties, have been remarkably silent on the challenges posed by the easy availability of uncensored Indian movies and the airing of Indian TV programmes. Besides, the media, especially private TV channels, has contributed to the problem by idolising Indian film stars and giving extensive coverage to gossip about their lives.

The cultural onslaught that Pakistan is facing from its larger neighbour is not unique. In several European countries, France in particular, there is resistance against the large share of Hollywood in the movie market and against the adoption of English words in the local language. Jack Lang, who served as French Culture Minister under Mitterrand, warned two decades ago of the dangers of the “Coca Colonisation of the minds.” The effort to purge the French language of foreign words is even older. The French Academy was set up in 1635 as an official authority to protect the purity of the French language. It has now been tasked to coin French words in place of English terms which have crept into French. France also has laws to limit the use of English on TV and to impose translations of English slogans in advertising. Unofficial academic or civil society organisations to guard against the mingling of English words in the national language exist in Germany, Russia and Spain. In China as well, some linguists have been objecting to the mushrooming of English loanword in Chinese.

The ban on Indian movies was imposed in 1965 and lifted in 2008. Today, there are good reasons for reinstating it. The Supreme Court has taken up the issue of combating vulgarity and obscenity, the main source of which is Bollywood. In addition, the ban is needed to preserve our cultural values and to protect our language from disfigurement.

But a prohibition on the screening of Indian movies in our cinemas will not be enough. The government would also have to enforce a complete ban on the import, production and sale of DVDs and videos of Indian movies and of films and children’s programmes of other countries which have been dubbed in Hindi.

Besides, to fill the gap created by a ban on Indian films, the government should provide financial support for the dubbing of quality foreign-produced movies, educational films and children’s programmes in our own languages. There is a precedent. In France, the government provides huge subsidies to dubbing firms. Also, the National Language Authority, like the French Academy, should be given the task of popularising and, if necessary, coining Urdu words to substitute foreign terms that have crept into our language.

This is neither a difficult nor an overly ambitious agenda for the government. All that is needed is the necessary political will.

The writer is a former member of the Pakistan Foreign Service. E-mail: asifezdi@yahoo.com

This article was published in 'The News International' newspaper on 3 September 2012

Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan: An Instrument of 4th Generation Warfare against Pakistan

The attack on the Pakistan Air Force's PAF Minhas airbase at Kamra on 16 August 2012 is part of the same pattern of terrorist attacks on Pakistani military installations and assets as the one carried out against the Pakistan Navy's PNS Mehran naval base in Karachi on 22 May 2011.

It is useful to look at the commonalities between the PNS Mehran and PAF Minhas attacks:

(i) Both were against Pakistan's military bases.

(ii) Both targeted Pakistan's high-value military assets: (a) the PNS Mehran attack targeting the Pakistan Navy's P-3C Orion Maritime Surveillance and Anti-Submarine/Shipping aircraft and (b) the PAF Kamra attack targeting the Pakistan Air Force's IL-78MP Air-to-Air Refuellers and Saab 2000 Airborne Early Warning & Control (AEW&C) aircraft.

(iii) The modus operandi of the terrorists in both attacks was similar: involving terrorists on foot, armed with automatic weapons, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and suicide vests.

(iv) Credit for both attacks was claimed by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).

The difference is that, in the case PNS Mehran, there was a failure of security and the terrorists succeeded in their objectives, whereas in the case of PAF Minhas, the attack was successfully thwarted and the terrorists failed in their objectives. Seemingly, the objectives of every TTP terrorist attack are twofold: to (a) erode Pakistan's capability to effectively defend itself by inflicting losses to military personnel and equipment and (b) discredit Pakistan internationally by demonstrating that Pakistan can neither prevent nor defend itself from such attacks.

This begs the question as to why the TTP, or any other domestic terrorist organization for that matter, would want to destroy those Pakistani military assets that are not being employed in the so-called "War on Terror" and that are not being used against the TTP or any other terrorist organization? The Pakistani weapon systems that have posed one of the greatest threats to the TTP in their mountain hideouts in the tribal areas have been the Pakistan Army Aviation's Cobra AH-1 helicopter gunships, which are based near Kamra at Ghazi for anti-TTP operations. Why would the TTP walk past the Cobra gunships that have pounded them relentlessly and target those aircraft that pose no threat and have done no damage to them? Maritime surveillance aircraft, anti-submarine/shipping aircraft, air-to-air refuellers and AEW&C aircraft pose no threat to the TTP or any other terrorist organization. If Pakistan is deprived of these aircraft, it would make no difference to the TTP or any other terrorist organization because they are not being used against them. From a terrorist's standpoint, therefore, targeting these military assets does not erode Pakistan's ability to fight against them. So why would the TTP then target them?

The answer is simple: TTP is not a domestic terrorist organization with a religious or political agenda but a veritable arm of a foreign intelligence agency that has long-term strategic designs against the Pakistani state. TTP is an instrument of a foreign power's policy of conducting asymetrical warfare against Pakistan, also known as "Fourth Generation Warfare" or "4GW." What makes TTP even more potent is that whilst it was created by one foreign intelligence agency, it is now being used by other foreign intelligence agencies with the same agenda. Thus, the TTP is engaged in a proxy war against Pakistan at the behest of foreign powers.

The faces and footsoldiers of TTP may be Pakistani (in many instances they have also been foreign), but the planners, financers, suppliers and trainers are not. It may be that the TTP footsoldiers who carry out terror attacks across Pakistan may not even be aware of the identity of their ultimate controllers and beneficiaries. They may even think that they are carrying out some religious Jihad when, in fact, all they are doing is serving the interests of foreign non-Muslim powers and inflicting harm on the world's only nuclear-armed Muslim country. This is not too far-fetched. Victor Ostrovsky, the former agent of the Israeli intelligence agency, Mossad, in his 1990 book, By Way of Deception: The Making and Unmaking of a Mossad Officer, revealed that, at any given time, the people who knew they were working for Mossad was only a small fraction of the actual number who were working for Mossad, all unaware of their actual employer.

Neutralizing Pakistan's maritime surveillance and anti-submarine/shipping capability can only benefit a state actor with a navy and naval designs against Pakistan. Similarly, neutralizing Pakistan's air-to-air refuelling and airborne early warning and radar jamming capabilities can only benefit a state actor with an air force and aerial designs against Pakistan. Neither of the two can benefit a terrorist organization engaged in urban terrorism and guerrilla warfare in mountainous terrain. Needless to say, terrorist organizations such as the TTP neither have naval or air power, so what threat are they neutralizing by targeting the naval and air power of Pakistan?

Attacking Pakistan's strategic installations also serves another purpose. One that is part of the objective to neutralize Pakistan's nuclear capability, which is the objective of more than one foreign power. By exposing gaps in Pakistan's security apparatus, those who wish to seek Pakistan's nuclear disarmament can argue that if Pakistani's military installations are vulnerable to terrorist penetration, then how vulnerable are its nuclear installations? Therefore, each terrorist attack on a military base in Pakistan builds the case against Pakistan and feeds the narrative and propaganda against Pakistan's nuclear capability. Of course, to anyone even vaguely familiar with the multiple and redundant layers of security and safeguards surrounding Pakistan's nuclear weapons and strategic installations, the idea of terrorists gaining access to nuclear weapons or even nuclear installations seems farfetched, if not ludicrous. But who is to educate foreign domestic public opinion when the airwaves are dominated by Western-controlled media, which toe the line of Western political, military and corporate interests.

Another factor that lends credence to the view that TTP is directly controlled by a foreign intelligence agency is the fact that these audacious attacks on defended military installations cannot be undertaken by a bunch of ragtag domestic terrorists. It takes finances, resources, weapons, ordinance, equipment, training and intelligence gathering to undertake terrorist attacks of the scale mounted on PNS Mehran and PAF Minhas. Only the intelligence agency of a state actor can sponsor and provide the finances, weapons, logistics, intelligence and training for such ambitious and audacious terrorist acts against the military installations of a nuclear power.

The lesson for Pakistan here is not to be complacent and be prepared at all times for such attacks against military and strategic installations. The enemies of Pakistan will continue to plan and attempt such attacks in future. PAF Minhas was not the last of them. Pakistan's needs to bolster the defences around all its military and strategic installations and improve intelligence with a view to pre-empting such terrorist attacks. When on the ground, all military aircraft should be parked in hardened aircraft shelters and reinforced hangars. Wide buffer zones with multiple and redundant security systems should surround all military installations, especially air bases.

Whenever a crime is committed, every good detective worth his salt needs to ask and seek an answer to one question: Who is the ultimate beneficiary of this crime? In the case of PNS Mehran and PAF Minhas, we must ask the question: Who is the ultimate beneficiary of the erosion of Pakistan's strategic military capability? Who stands to gain most from the destruction of Pakistan's P-3C Orion maritime surveillance and anti-submarine warfare aircraft, the IL-78MP air-to-air refuellers and the Saab 2000 AEW&C aircraft? The answer will lead us to the real culprits.

Founder of Pakistan

Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah:

“Few individuals significantly alter the course of history. Fewer still modify the map of the world. Hardly anyone can be credited with creating a nation-state. Mohammad Ali Jinnah did all three.”

(Stanley Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan)

Jinnah's prediction of the collapse of Western banking in 1948

The founder of Pakistan, Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, predicted the collapse of the Western banking system on 1 July 1948 in his speech on the occasion of the inauguration of the State Bank of Pakistan at Karachi:

"The economic system of the West has created almost insoluble problems for humanity and to many of us it appears that only a miracle can save it from disaster that is not facing the world. It has failed to do justice between man and man and to eradicate friction from the international field. On the contrary, it was largely responsible for the two world wars in the last half century. The Western world, in spite of its advantages, of mechanization and industrial efficiency is today in a worse mess than ever before in history. The adoption of Western economic theory and practice will not help us in achieving our goal of creating a happy and contended people. We must work our destiny in our own way and present to the world an economic system based on true Islamic concept of equality of manhood and social justice. We will thereby be fulfilling our mission as Muslims and giving to humanity the message of peace which alone can save it and secure the welfare, happiness and prosperity of mankind."

Source: http://www.sbp.org.pk/about/history/h_moments.htm

When Mountains Move: The Story of Chagai

Rai Muhammad Saleh Azam

Pakistan crossed the nuclear threshold to become a declared nuclear weapons state on 28 May 1998 after it detonated five nuclear devices in the Ras Koh Hills in Chagai, Balochistan.

Chagai’s nexus with Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme first became known to the Pakistani public and the world back in 1994 when the book, Critical Mass, written by William E. Burrows and Robert Windrem was first published.

However, the story goes further than that.

CHAGAI: THE BACKGROUND

The story of Chagai began in Quetta, Balochistan in 1976 when Brig. Muhammad Sarfaraz, Chief of Staff at 5 Corps Headquarters received a transmission from the Pakistan Army General Headquarters (GHQ), Rawalpindi. The message directed the Corps Commander to make available an Army helicopter to a forthcoming team of scientists from the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) for operational reconnaissance of some areas in Balochistan.

The PAEC team comprising of Dr. Ishfaq Ahmed, Member (Technical) and Dr. Ahsan Mubarak landed at Quetta and were provided the helicopter as per the GHQ instructions. Over a span of three days, the PAEC scientists reconnoitred, several times, the area between Turbat, Awaran and Khusdar to the south, Naukundi to the east and Kharan to the west.

Their objective: to find a suitable location for an underground nuclear test, preferably a mountain.

After a hectic and careful search they found a mountain that matched their specifications. This was a 185-metre base-to-summit high granite mountain in the Ras Koh Hills in the Chagai Division of Balochistan, which, at their highest point, rise to a height of 9,367 feet (3,009 metres) above sea level. The Ras Koh Hills are independent of and should not be confused with the Chagai Hills further north on the Pak-Afghan border, in which, to date, no nuclear test activity has taken place.

The PAEC requirement was that the mountain should be "bone dry" and capable of withstanding a 20 kilotonne nuclear explosion from the inside. Tests were conducted to measure the water content of the mountains and the surrounding area and to measure the capability of the mountain’s rock to withstand a nuclear test. Once this was confirmed, Dr. Ishfaq Ahmed commenced work on a three-dimensional survey of the area with the help of the Geological Survey of Pakistan (GSP).

This survey took one year to conduct and, in 1977, it was decided that the proposed tunnel to be bored in the mountain should have an overburden of a 700 metre high mountain over it, thus sufficient to withstand 20-40 kilotonnes of nuclear force. In the same year, Brig. Muhammad Sarfaraz, who, in the interim, had been posted to GHQ Rawalpindi, was summoned by President Zia-ul-Haq and was told that the PAEC wanted to lease him from the Army to carry out work related to the Pakistan nuclear programme. This resulted in the creation of an organization called the Special Development Works (SDW), a subsidiary of the PAEC but directly reporting to the Chief of the Army Staff and entrusted with the task of preparing Pakistan’s nuclear test sites. Brig. Sarfaraz, for all practical purposes, headed the SDW, a nuclear variant of the Pakistan Army’s famous Frontier Works Organization (FWO) which, along with the Chinese, built the Karakorum Highway between 1966-78.

The primary task of SDW was to prepare underground test sites (both horizontal and vertical shaft tunnels) for 20-kilotonne nuclear devices, along with all the allied infrastructure and facilities. The sites had to be designed in such a way that they could be utilized at short notice (in less than a week) and were to be completed by 31 December 1979 at the latest.

After a series of meetings between SDW and PAEC officials and the President of Pakistan, it was decided that SDW should prepare 2-3 separate sites. Therefore, a second site for a vertical shaft tunnel was prepared in the Kharan Desert, at a barren location approximately 150 kilometres west of the Ras Koh test site, located in a rolling sandy desert valley lined with sand ridges between the Ras Koh Hills to the north and the Siahan Range to the south.

RAS KOH HILLS: THE TOPOGRAPHY

Photo (right): The Ras Koh Hills on the Dalbandin side with the N40 in the foreground. The 28 May 1998 nuclear tests took place behind these hills approximately 12 km south of the spot at which this picture was taken. (Photo courtesy: Agha Waseem Ahmed)

Ras Koh literally means, "Gateway to the Mountains" in Urdu, Arabic and Farsi. The Balochistan Plateau in southwestern Pakistan lies east of the Sulaiman and Kirthar Ranges, with an average elevation of about 600 meters. Mountains spread in various directions, attaining elevations of 2,000-3,000 meters, though plateaus and basins predominate the scene. The Toba Kakar Range and Chagai Hills in the north form the border of Pakistan with Afghanistan. The mountains and hills are carved by innumerable channels which contain water only after rains, though little water reaches the low-lying basins. Numerous alluvial fans are found in the Balochistan Desert. A structural depression separates the Chagai Hills and the Ras Koh Range to the south, consisting of flood plains and areas covered with thin layers of salt. Outside the monsoon zone, Balochistan receives scanty and irregular rainfall (4 inches annually); the temperature is very high in summer and very low in winter. Apart from the Toba Kakar Range, which has scattered juniper, tamarisk and pistachio trees, the other ranges are largely devoid of vegetation. Most of the people, therefore, lead nomadic life, raising camels, sheep and goats. The Siahan Range is in the west-central part of Balochistan, while the coastal Makran Range which skirts the south of Pakistan contains valuable deposits of coal, iron, gas, chromite, copper and several other minerals. Balochistan is fortunate to have considerable mineral wealth of natural gas, coal, chromite, lead, sulphur and marble.

KHARAN DESERT: THE TOPOGRAPHY

The Kharan Desert, also known as the “Sandy Desert” or “Balochistan Desert”, is located in northwest Balochistan. Pakistan, a mostly dry country characterized by extremes of altitude and temperature, has three main river basins: Indus, Kharan and Makran. The Indus Plain extends principally along the eastern side of the river, and the Balochistan Plateau lies to the south-west. Four other topographic areas are the narrow coastal plain bordering the Arabian Sea; the Thar Desert on the border with India; the mountains of the north and north-west; and the Kharan Basin, to the west of the Balochistan Plateau. The Kharan Basin is known as a closed basin because the entire basin's catchment water is used for agriculture and domestic requirements. The Kharan Desert area consists of shifting sand dunes with an underlying pebble-conglomerate floor. The moving dunes reach heights of between 15 and 30 meters. Level areas between the dunes are a hard-topped pan when dry and a treacherous, sandy-clay mush when wet. The barren wastes that occupy almost half of Iran, with its continuation into Kharan in Pakistan, form a continuous stretch of absolute barrenness from the alluvial fans of the Alborz Mountains in the north of Iran to the edge of the plateau in Balochistan, Pakistan, more than 1,200 km to the south-east. In altitude these central deserts slope from about 1,000 m in the north to about 250 m on in the south-west. Average annual rainfall throughout these deserts is well under 100 mm. The desert includes areas of inland drainage and dry lakes (hamuns). The Gowd-e-Zereh (lake basin) in Iran, which occasionally receives excess drainage, is separated from Kharan in Pakistan by low hills, which, with the highlands around the extinct volcano of Koh-e-Tafta'n, cause the Mashkel River to form a lake. The surface of the Hamun-e-Mashkhel, which is some 85 kilometres long and 35 kilometres wide, is littered with sun-cracked clay, oxidized pebbles, salty marshes and crescent-shaped moving sand dunes. The area is known particularly for its constant mirages and sudden severe sandstorms.

Subsequently, the Chagai-Ras Koh-Kharan areas became restricted entry zones and were closed to the public, prompting rumours that Pakistan had given airbases to the United States. The fact that USAID had set up an office in Turbat, Balochistan only added fuel to such rumours.

A 3,325 feet long horizontal shaft tunnel was bored in the Koh Kambaran Massif in the Ras Koh Hills , which was 8-9 feet in diameter and was shaped like a fishhook for it to be self-sealing. The vertical shaft tunnel in the Kharan Desert, 116 kilometres (73 miles) to the southwest of the Koh Kambaran tunnel, was 300 feet by 200 feet and was L-shaped . Both test sites had an array of extensive cables, sensors and monitoring stations. In addition to the main tunnels, SDW built 24 cold test sites, 46 short tunnels and 35 underground accommodations for troops and command, control and monitoring facilities. At Ras Koh, some of these were located inside the granite mountains.

Both the nuclear test sites at Ras Koh and Kharan took 2-3 years to prepare and were completed by 1980, before Pakistan acquired the capability to develop a nuclear weapon. This showed both confidence and resolve in Pakistan’s nuclear programme as well as faith in Almighty God.

THE WAH GROUP: DESIGNERS AND MANUFACTURERS OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR DEVICE

In March 1974, Hafeez Qureshi, who at the time was heading the Radiation and Isotope Applications Division (RIAD) at the Pakistan Institute of Science & Technology (PINSTECH) at Nilore, 23 kilometres south-east of Islamabad, and a mechanical engineer par excellence, was summoned by the then Chairman of the PAEC, Munir Ahmad Khan in a meeting that was attended, among others, by Dr. Abdus Salam, then Adviser for Science and Technology to the Government of Pakistan and Dr. Riaz-ud-Din, Member (Technical), PAEC. Qureshi was told that he join hands on a project of national importance with another expert, Dr. Zaman Sheikh, then working with the Defence Science & Technology Organization (DESTO), located 15 kilometres east of Islamabad at the foot of the scenic Murree Hills. The word "bomb" was never used in the meeting but Qureshi knew exactly what he was being asked to do. Their task would be to build the mechanics of Pakistan’s first atomic bomb. The project would be located at Wah, appropriately next to the main and largest complex of the Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF), strategically close to the hills and conveniently close to the capital, Islamabad.

The work at Wah began under the code name of "Research & Development" (R&D) and Qureshi, Zaman and their team of scientists and engineers came to be known as "The Wah Group". Initial work was limited to research and development of the explosives to be used in the nuclear device. However, the terms of reference subsequently expanded to include chemical, mechanical and precision engineering and triggering mechanisms. They procured equipment for reverse-engineering from foreign sources where they could and developed their own technology indigenously where restrictions prevented the purchase of equipment from abroad.

KIRANA HILLS, SARGODHA: THE COLD TESTS

Pakistan’s first cold test of its nuclear device was carried out on 11 March 1983 in the Kirana Hills near Sargodha, home of the Pakistan Air Force’s main air base and the Central Ammunition Depot (CAD). Cold Test (CT) is a means of testing the working of a nuclear device without a nuclear explosion and the resultant radiation. This is achieved by triggering an actual bomb by initiating a chain reaction but without the radioactive fissile material needed to detonate it. The test was overseen by Dr. Ishfaq Ahmed.

The tunnels at Kirana Hills, Sargodha are reported to have been bored after those at Chagai, i.e. sometime between 1979 and 1983. As in Chagai, the tunnels at Kirana Hills had been bored and then sealed and this task was also undertaken by SDW.

Prior to the cold tests, an advance team was sent to de-seal, open and clean the tunnels and to make sure the tunnels were clear of the wild boars that are found in abundance in the Sargodha region. The damage which these wild boars could do to men and equipment could not be understated when one such intrepid wild boar later cost the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) an F-16 when a direct impact between the aircraft and the wild boar in the middle of the runway resulted in the aircraft’s front undercarriage being sheared off as it came in to land at Sargodha Air Base. Luckily, the pilot ejected with minor injuries thanks to the aircraft's Zero-Zero ejection seat. The $20 million F-16 was, however, severely damaged and had to be written off. It is surprising that the otherwise highly trained and professional PAF did not deem it fit and appropriate to fence the Sargodha Air Base complex. This would have cost the PAF much less than $20 million, which is the eventual price it had to pay for its failure in doing so.

After clearing of the tunnels, a PAEC diagnostic team headed by Dr. Samar Mubarakmand arrived on the scene with trailers fitted with computers and diagnostic equipment. This was followed by the arrival of the Wah Group with the actual nuclear device, in sub-assembly form. The device was assembled and then placed inside the tunnel. A monitoring system was set up with around 20 cables linking various parts of the device with oscillators in diagnostic vans parked near the Kirana Hills. The Wah Group had indigenously developed the explosive HMX (His Majesty’s Explosive) which was used to trigger the device.

The device was tested using the "push-button" technique as opposed to the "radio-link" technique used at Chagai fourteen years later. The first test was to see whether the triggering mechanism created the necessary neutrons which would start a fission chain reaction in the real bomb. However, when the button was pushed, most of the wires connecting the device to the oscillators were severed due to errors committed in the preparation of the cables. At first, it was thought that the device had malfunctioned but closer scrutiny of two of the oscillators confirmed that the neutrons had indeed come out and a chain reaction had taken place. Pakistan’s first cold test of a nuclear device had been successful and 11 March became a red letter day in the calendar of the Pakistan nuclear programme. A second cold test was undertaken soon afterwards which was witnessed by, among others, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Finance Minister, Lt. Gen. K.M. Arif, Chief of Staff and Munir Ahmed Khan, Chairman, PAEC.

The need to improve and perfect the design of Pakistan’s first nuclear device required constant testing. As a result, between 1983 and 1990, the Wah Group conducted more than 24 cold tests of the nuclear device at Kirana Hills with the help of mobile diagnostic equipment. These tests were carried out in 24 horizontal-shaft tunnels measuring 100-150 feet in length which were bored inside the Kirana Hills. Later due to excessive US intelligence and satellite focus on the Kirana Hills site, it was abandoned and the CT facility was shifted to the Kala-Chitta Range.

By March 1984, Kahuta Research Laboratories (KRL) had independently carried out its own cold tests of its nuclear device near Kahuta.

Also, during the 1983-1990 period, the Wah Group went on to design and develop an atomic bomb small enough to be carried on the wing of a small fighter such as the F-16. It worked alongside the PAF to evolve and perfect delivery techniques of the nuclear bomb including ‘conventional free-fall’, ‘loft bombing’, ‘toss bombing’ and ‘low-level laydown’ attack techniques using combat aircraft. Today, the PAF has perfected all four techniques of nuclear weapons delivery using F-16 and Mirage-V combat aircraft indigenously configured to carry nuclear weapons.

THE INDIAN CHALLENGE

On 11 and 13 May 1998, India conducted what it claimed were a total of 5 nuclear tests at Pokhran, Rajasthan near the Pakistan border and declared itself a “nuclear weapons state”. This act by India destabilized the balance of power in South Asia heavily in India’s favour. The dust at Pokhran had yet to settle when high-ranking Indian politicians, government officials and military personnel began issuing provocative statements against Pakistan. India declared that it would thenceforth pursue a “pro-active” policy on Jammu & Kashmir. Pakistan was told to realise the “new geo-political realities in South Asia”. Right-wing allies and elements within the Hindu-supremacist Indian BJP government demanded the Indian invasion and annexation of Azad (Free) Jammu & Kashmir and Pakistan’s Northern Areas.

The underlying message for Pakistan was this “give up your claim on Jammu & Kashmir and become forever subservient to Indian hegemony in South Asia”. India was now the nuclear weapons power and Pakistan wasn’t. Therefore, it is Pakistan which must capitulate on Jammu & Kashmir and only the dictate of India would be allowed in South Asia. In the event of another India-Pakistan War, India would be able to use nuclear weapons if its armed forces were defeated or put in a tight corner. Indian warplanners felt that the use of small battlefield nuclear devices against the Pakistan Army cantonments, armoured and infantry columns and PAF bases and nuclear and military industrial facilities would not meet with an adverse reaction from the world community so long as civilian casualties could be kept to a minimum. This way, India would defeat Pakistan, force its armed forces into a humiliating surrender and occupy and annex the Northern Areas of Pakistan and Azad Jammu & Kashmir. India would then carve up Pakistan into tiny states based on ethnic divisions (and later on, perhaps, absorb them into a ‘Greater India’) and that would be the end of the “Pakistan problem” once and for all.

Such a plan could never be allowed to succeed. In the face of national survival, all other things become secondary. Therefore, it was decided that Pakistan had to go nuclear to guarantee its national survival, its security and its territorial integrity and to deny India what would have become an overwhelming and unchallengable military and strategic advantage over Pakistan. Defence, security and strategic concerns were, therefore, the primary and overriding factors in deciding the course, which Pakistan ultimately took.

Other secondary factors which influenced Pakistan’s decision to go ahead with the tests were (i) to give credibility to Pakistan’s nuclear capability; (ii) to prevent a situation from arising in which India, after misreading or underestimating Pakistan’s nuclear capability, embarks upon any misadventure against Pakistan, thereby increasing the chances of a nuclear war; (iii) to restore the balance of power in South Asia and within the Pakistan-India equation, in the eyes of itself, India and the world; (iii) to deny India unilateral technical advantage that it may have gained from the tests and (iii) to use the opportunity and excuse of the Indian tests without having to attract the harsher censure that Pakistan would inevitably have attracted from the world community had it conducted the tests unilaterally. By conducting the tests in response to those of India, Pakistan sought to dilute global criticism and reaction, which would be divided over both the countries and, to some extent, rightly put the blame on India for initiating the nuclear arms race in South Asia. Tertiary factors included (i) acquiring political, diplomatic and prestige advantages for itself; (ii) increasing Pakistan’s position and status in the Islamic and Arab world, (iii) denying India the political, diplomatic and prestige advantages that would have accrued to it had it become the only nuclear power in South Asia; (iv) diluting India’s position as a nuclear power; and (v) gaining scientific and technological know-how that would help Pakistan in both military and civil applications.

THE ROAD TO CHAGAI

A meeting of the Defence Committee of the Cabinet (DCC) was convened on the morning of 15 May 1998 at the Prime Minister’s Secretariat, Islamabad to discuss the geo-political situation and strategic crisis arising out of the Indian nuclear tests. The meeting was chaired by the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif who himself was holding the portfolio of defence and attended by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Gohar Ayub Khan, the Minister of Finance & Economic Affairs, Sartaj Aziz, the Foreign Secretary, Shamshad Ahmed Khan and the three Chiefs of Staff of the Army, Air Force and Navy, namely General Jehangir Karamat, Air Chief Marshal Pervaiz Mehdi Qureshi and Admiral Fasih Bokhari respectively.

Since Dr. Ishfaq Ahmed, Chairman of the PAEC, was, at the time, on a visit to the United States and Canada, the responsibility of giving a technical assessment of the Indian nuclear tests and Pakistan’s preparedness to give a matching response to India fell on the shoulders of Dr. Samar Mubarakmand, Member (Technical), PAEC. Dr. Mubarakmand was in charge of the PAEC’s Directorate of Technical Development (DTD), one of the most secretive organizations in the labyrinth of Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure, the location of which is still unknown to the world and is one of Pakistan’s best kept secrets. It may be that the DTD is the forerunner of the National Development Complex (NDC), the designers and manufacturers of, among other things, Pakistan’s solid-fuelled Shaheen class of medium and intermediate range ballistic nuclear missile systems. The location of the NDC is not exactly known but it is presumed to be located at Fatehjung, a picturesque area of rolling countryside north-west of Islamabad. Dr. Mubarakmand had supervised several cold tests since 1983 and was responsible for overseeing all of PAEC’s classified projects. Also, in attendance was Dr. A.Q. Khan, Director of the renamed Khan (formerly Kahuta) Research Laboratories (KRL), Kahuta.

There were two points on the DCC’s agenda: Firstly, whether or not Pakistan should carry out nuclear tests in order to respond to India’s nuclear tests. Secondly, if Pakistan does go ahead with the tests then which of the two organizations, PAEC or KRL, should carry out the tests.

The discussions went on for a few hours and encompassed the financial, diplomatic, military, geo-political and national security concerns. Finance Minister Sartaj Aziz was the only person who opposed the tests on financial grounds due to the economic recession, the low foreign exchange reserves of the country and the negative effect of inevitable economic sanctions which would be imposed on Pakistan if it carried out the tests. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif neither opposed nor proposed the tests. The remainder spoke in favour of conducting the tests.

While giving his technical assessment on behalf of the PAEC, Dr. Mubarakmand said that Pakistan had a modern state-of-the-art international seismic station near the capital, Islamabad, and also had seismic stations located all over Pakistan including at locations near the Pakistan-India border. He said that these seismic stations had recorded only one nuclear device at Pokhran on 11 May 1998 and not three as India was wrongfully claiming. He said that the remaining two, in all probability, had fizzled out, i.e. were failures. He also said that no thermonuclear or hydrogen bomb test was carried out by the Indians on either 11 or 13 May 1998 as none of the yields were large enough for such a test. In all likelihood, the Indians may have attempted a thermonuclear test, but it too had failed. Dr. Mubarakmand added that if it is decided that Pakistan should go ahead with nuclear tests of its own, then the PAEC is fully prepared and capable of carrying out the nuclear tests within 10 days.

Dr. A.Q. Khan, speaking on behalf of KRL, also asserted that KRL was fully prepared and capable of carrying out nuclear tests within 10 days if the orders were given by the DCC. Dr. Khan reminded the DCC that it was KRL which had first enriched uranium, converted it into metal, machined it into semi spheres of metal, designed their own atomic bomb and carried out cold tests on their own. All this was achieved without any help from PAEC. He said that KRL was fully independent in the nuclear field. Dr. Khan went on to say that since it was KRL which first made inroads into the nuclear field, especially in uranium enrichment, for Pakistan, it should, therefore, be given the honour of carrying out Pakistan’s first nuclear tests. He added that KRL would feel let down if wasn’t conferred the privilege of doing so.

Thus, both the PAEC and KRL were equal to the task. However, PAEC had two additional advantages over KRL. Firstly, it was PAEC which had constructed Pakistan’s two nuclear test sites at Chagai, Balochistan. Secondly, PAEC had greater experience than KRL in conducting cold tests.

The DCC meeting concluded without any resolution of the two agenda points.

The Chairman of the PAEC, Dr. Ishfaq Ahmed, cut short his foreign trip and returned to Pakistan on 16 May 1998. The next day, on the morning of 17 May 1998, he received a call from the Pakistan Army GHQ, Rawalpindi informing him to remain on stand-by for a meeting with the Prime Minister. He was thereafter summoned by the Prime Minister House, Islamabad where he went accompanied by Dr. Mubarakmand. The Prime Minister asked the PAEC Chairman for his opinion on the two points which were discussed in the DCC meeting of 15 May 1998. Dr. Ahmed told the Prime Minister that the decision to test or not to test was that of the Government of Pakistan. As far as the PAEC preparedness and capability was concerned, they were ready to do their duty as and when required to do so. The Prime Minister said that eyes of the world were focused on Pakistan and failure to conduct the tests would put the credibility of the Pakistan nuclear programme in doubt and would encourage India into embarking on a misadventure against Pakistan – a concern expressed by many quarters. The PAEC Chairman's reply was, “Mr. Prime Minister, take a decision and, insha’Allah, I give you the guarantee of success,”. He was told to prepare for the tests but remain on stand-by for the final decision.

We know that the order to conduct the tests was given on 18 May 1998. Since the DCC meeting of 15 May 1998 proved inconclusive, it is believed that a more exclusive DCC meeting was held on either 16 or 17 May 1998 attended only by the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, the Finance Minister and the three Chiefs of Staff of the Army, Air Force and Navy. This meeting has never been officially acknowledged but it must have been held as neither the Prime Minister alone nor the Chief of the Army Staff alone could have made the decision to conduct the nuclear tests. The DCC was the only competent authority to decide on this matter, especially since the National Security Council (NSC), Pakistan’s apex security decision-making body and the National Command Authority (NCA), Pakistan’s nuclear command and control authority for its strategic nuclear forces, did not exist at that time. In this meeting, the two agenda points of the DCC meeting of 15 May 1998 were decided. Firstly, Pakistan would give a matching and befitting response to India by conducting nuclear tests of its own. Secondly, the task would be assigned to the PAEC, who were the best equipped and most experienced to carry out the tests.

On 18 May 1998, the Chairman of the PAEC was again summoned to the Prime Minister House where he was relayed the decision of the DCC. “Dhamaka kar dein” (“Conduct the explosion”) were the exact Urdu words used by the Prime Minister to inform him of the Government’s decision to conduct the nuclear tests. The PAEC Chairman went back to his office and gave orders to his staff to prepare for the tests and called for an urgent extraordinary meeting of the top PAEC executives, scientists and engineers. Simultaneously, GHQ and Air Headquarters (AHQ) issued orders to the relevant quarters in 12 Corps, Quetta, the National Logistics Cell (NLC), the Army Aviation Corps and No. 6 Air Transport Support (ATS) Squadron led by Group Captain Sarfraz Ahmad Khan at Chaklala Air Base respectively to extend the necessary logistics support to the PAEC in this regard. The Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) also directed the national airline, PIA, to make available a Boeing 737 passenger aircraft at short notice for the ferrying of PAEC officials, scientists, engineers and technicians to Balochistan.

When news reached Dr. A.Q. Khan at KRL that the task had been assigned to PAEC and not KRL, he lodged a strong protest with General Jehangir Karamat. Dr. A.Q. Khan was upset, and rightly so. A man who is known as the “father” of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme deserved to be given more importance than he was, at least for protocol reasons if nothing else. The Army Chief, in turn, called the Prime Minister. Amongst the two, it was decided that KRL personnel, including Dr. A.Q. Khan, would also be involved in the nuclear test preparations and present at the time of testing alongside those of the PAEC.

In the meantime, PAEC convened a meeting to decide the modus operandi, quantity and size of the nuclear tests to be conducted. This meeting was chaired by Dr. Ishfaq Ahmed and attended by Dr. Samar Mubarakmand and other high-ranking executives, scientists and engineers of the PAEC. It was decided that since the Indian nuclear tests had presented Pakistan with an opportunity to conduct nuclear tests for the first time after 14 years of having conducted only cold tests, the maximum benefit should be derived from this opportunity. It was, therefore, decided, that multiple tests would be carried out of varying yields as well as the live testing of the triggering mechanisms. Since the five horizontal shaft tunnels at Ras Koh Hills and the single vertical shaft tunnel at Kharan had the capability to collectively host a total of six tests, therefore, it was resolved that six different nuclear devices of different designs, sizes and yields would be selected, all of which had been previously cold tested.

Immediately afterwards, began the process of fitness and quality checks of the various components of the nuclear devices and the testing equipment. A large but smooth logistics operation also got under way with the help of the Pakistan Army and Air Force. This operation involved moving men and equipment as well as the nuclear devices to the Chagai test sites from various parts of the country.

On 19 May 1998, two teams comprising of 140 PAEC scientists, engineers and technicians left for Chagai, Balochistan on two separate PIA Boeing 737 flights. Also on board were teams from the Wah Group, the Theoretical Group, the Directorate of Technical Development (DTD) and the Diagnostics Group. Some of the men and equipment were transported via road using NLC trucks escorted by the members of the Special Services Group (SSG), the elite commando force of the Pakistan Army and Pakistan Army Aviation AH-1 Cobra gunship helicopters.

Various support facilities were established at both the test sites, including instrumentation bunkers and observation posts. All the installations including the tunnel portals and the instrumentation and fire control cables leading into the tunnel shafts were camouflaged using canvass and net. The facilities were made to look like a small hamlet using adobe huts so as to deceive satellite surveillance. The tunnel portal itself was located inside an adobe hut. Barbed wire was placed around all the facilities so as to minimise the number of tracks and to keep pedestrian and vehicular movement on designated tracks. Vehicle tracks caused by incoming and outgoing trucks and jeeps were continuously erased by a team of soldiers assigned to the task. Support camps were established a few hundred yards away from Ground Zero at both the sites. These included lodging, food and water, restroom, shelter and communications facilities. These too were camouflaged. At Ras Koh, these support facilities were located directly south of the mountain in which the shafts had been bored.

The nuclear devices were themselves flown in semi-knocked down (SKD) sub-assembly form on two flights of PAF C-130 Hercules tactical transport aircraft from PAF Chaklala in northern Punjab to Dalbandin Airfield, situated in the Chagai District south-east of the Chagai Hills in Balochistan, escorted even within Pakistani airspace by four PAF F-16s armed with air-to-air missiles. At the same time, PAF F-7P air defence fighters, also armed with air-to-air missiles, were on CAP guarding the aerial frontiers of Pakistan against intruders. Both the nuclear devices (the bomb mechanism, the HMX explosive shields and casing) and the fissile material (the highly enriched uranium components) were divided into two consignments and flown separately on two independent flights of the Hercules. The PAEC did not want to put all its nuclear eggs in one basket in case something adverse was to happen to the aircraft. The security of the devices and the fissile material was so strict that that PAF F-16 escort pilots had been secretly given standing orders that in the unlikely event of the C-130 being hijacked or flown outside of Pakistani airspace, they were to shoot down the aircraft before it left Pakistan’s airspace. The F-16s were ordered to escort the C-130s to the Dalbandin airfield in Balochistan with their radio communications equipment turned off so that no orders, in the interim, could be conveyed to them to act otherwise. They were also ordered to ignore any orders to the contrary that got through to them during the duration of the flight even if such orders seemingly originated from Air Headquarters.

Once at the Dalbandin airfield south-east of the Chagai Hills, the sub-assembled parts of the nuclear devices were carefully offloaded from the aircraft and were separately taken in sub-assembled form to the test sites at Ras Koh Hills and Kharan presumably on Pakistan Army Aviation Mil Mi-17 helicopters. At Ras Koh Hills in Chagai, they were taken into the five ‘Zero Rooms’ located at the end of the kilometre long horizontal tunnels. Dr. Samar Mubarakmand personally supervised the complete assembly of all five nuclear devices. Diagnostic cables were thereafter laid from the tunnel to the telemetry. The cables connected all five nuclear devices with a command observation post 10 kilometres away. Afterwards, a complete simulated test was carried out by tele-command. This process of preparing the nuclear devices and laying of the cables and the establishment of the fully functional command and observation post took five days to complete.

On 25 May 1998, soldiers of the Pakistan Army’s 12 Corps arrived to seal the tunnel. They were supervised by engineers and technicians from the Pakistan Army Engineering Corps, the Frontier Works Organisation (FWO) and the Special Development Works (SDW). Dr. Samar Mubarakmand himself walked a total of 5 kilometres back and forth in the hot tunnels checking and re-checking the devices and the cables, which would be buried forever under the concrete. Finally, the cables were plugged into the nuclear devices. The process of the sealing the tunnels thereafter began with the mixing of the cement and the sand and their pouring into the tunnels. It took a total of 6,000 cement bags to seal the tunnel and twice the amount of sand.

The tunnels were sealed and plugged by the afternoon of 26 May 1998 and by the afternoon of 27 May 1998, the cement had completely dried out due to the excessive heat of the summer desert. After the engineers certified that the concrete had hardened and the site was fit for the tests it was communicated to the Prime Minister via the GHQ that the site was ready.

The date and time for Pakistan’s rendezvous with destiny was set for 3:00 p.m. on 28 May 1998.

PAKISTAN’S ‘FINEST HOUR’

Thursday, 28 May 1998 dawned with an air alert over all military and strategic installations of Pakistan. The PAF had earlier been put on red alert to respond to the remote but real possibility of a joint Indo-Israeli pre-emptive strike against its nuclear installations. Pakistan thought it fit to be safe rather than sorry. PAF F-16A and F-7P air defence fighters were scrambled from air bases around the country to remain vigilant and prepared for any eventuality.

Before twilight, the automatic data transmission link from all Pakistani seismic stations to the outside world was switched off.

At Chagai, it was a clear day. Bright, warm and sunny without a cloud in sight. There was a slight breeze. All personnel, civil and military, were evacuated from ‘Ground Zero’ except for members of the Diagnostics Group and the firing team. They had been involved in digging out and removing some equipment lying there since 1978.

Ten members of the team reached the Observation Post (OP) located 10-kilometres away from Ground Zero. The firing equipment was checked for one last time at 1:30 p.m. and prayers were offered. An hour later, at 2:30 p.m., a khaki-brown battle-camouflaged Pakistan Army Aviation Mil Mi-17 helicopter carrying the team of observers including PAEC Chairman, Dr. Ishfaq Ahmed, KRL Director, Dr. A.Q. Khan, and four other scientists from KRL including Dr. Fakhr Hashmi, Dr. Javed Ashraf Mirza (who later became Director, KRL on Dr. A.Q. Khan’s retirement from the post in March 2001), Dr. M. Nasim Khan and S. Mansoor Ahmed arrived at the site. Also accompanying them was a Pakistan Army team headed by Lt. Gen. Zulfikar Ali, Chief of the Combat Division.

At 3:00 p.m., a truck carrying the last lot of the personnel and soldiers involved in the site preparations passed by the OP. Soon afterwards, the all-clear was given to conduct the test as the site had been fully evacuated.

Amongst the 20 men present, one young man, Muhammad Arshad Ali, the Chief Scientific Officer, who had designed the triggering mechanism, was selected to push the button. He was asked to recite “All Praise be to Allah” and push the button. At exactly 3:16 p.m. Pakistan Standard Time, the button was pushed and Muhammad Arshad stepped from obscurity into history.

As soon as the button was pushed, the control system was taken over by computer. The signal was passed through the air-link initiating six steps in the firing sequence while at the same time bypassing, one after the other, each of the security systems put in place to prevent accidental detonation. Each step was confirmed by the computer, switching on power supplies for each stage. On the last leg of the sequence, the high voltage power supply responsible for detonating the nuclear devices was activated.

As the firing sequence passed through each level and shut down the safety switches and activating the power supply, each and every step was being recorded by the computer via the telemetry which is an apparatus for recording readings of an instrument and transmitting them via radio. A radiation-hardened television camera with special lenses recorded the outer surface of the mountain.

As the firing sequence continued through its stages, twenty pairs of eyes were glued on the mountain 10 kilometres away. There was deafening silence within and outside of the OP.

The high voltage electrical power wave simultaneously reached, with microsecond synchronization, the triggers in all the explosive HMX lenses symmetrically encircling the Beryllium/ Uranium-238 reflector shield and the ball of Uranium 235 around the initiator core in all five devices.

When the electrical current ran through the wires to the lenses, an explosion was triggered in all five of the devices. Because of the symmetrical nature of the placement of the explosives, a spherically imploding shock wave was set off, instantly squeezing the Berylium/Uranium-238, the Uranium-235, and the initiator. The Berylium/Uranium-238 shield was pushed inward by the explosion, compressing the grapefruit-sized ball of Uranium-235 to the size of a plum in a microsecond. The Uranium-235 went from a subcritical to a supercritical density, and the initiator at the centre was similarly squeezed. The process of atoms fissioning - or splitting apart - began.

Neutrons released from the initiator began striking and bombarding the Uranium-235 at an extremely rapid rate. In each instance in which a neutron hit a Uranium atom, the atom split, creating two more neutrons, which in turn hit two more atoms, which split into four neutrons, which found four new atoms, thus splitting into eight neutrons, sixteen, thirty-two, sixty-four, one hundred and twenty-eight, two hundred and fifty-six and so on. This was the runaway chain reaction. With the splitting of each atom, a terrific amount of energy was released along with a variety of lethal atomic particles.

A short while after the button was pushed, the earth in and around the Ras Koh Hills trembled. The OP vibrated. Smoke and dust burst out through the five points where the nuclear devices were buried. The mountain shook and changed colour as the dust from thousands of years was dislodged from its surface. Its dark granite rock turning white as de-oxidisation occurred from the fierce radioactive forces operating from within. A huge thick cloud of beige dust then enveloped the mountain.

In the OP, shouts of “Nara-e-Takbeer” and “Allah-o-Akbar” (God is Great) went up.

The time-frame, from the moment when the button was pushed to the moment the detonations inside the mountain took place, was thirty seconds. For those in the OP, watching in pin-drop silence with their eyes focused on the mountain, those thirty seconds were the longest in their lives. It was the culmination of a journey which started over 20 years ago. It was the moment of truth and triumph against heavy odds, trials and tribulations. At the end of those thirty seconds lay Pakistan’s date with destiny.

Dr. A.Q. Khan later described the five devices as boosted fission devices. “One was a big bomb with a yield of about 30-35 kilotonnes…the others were small tactical weapons of low yield…they can be used on the battlefield”, he said.

The Pakistani Foreign Ministry would later describe it as “Pakistan’s finest hour”. Pakistan had become the world’s seventh nuclear power and the first nuclear weapons state in the Islamic World.

Two days later, on Saturday, 30 May 1998, Pakistan conducted its sixth nuclear test at 1:10 p.m. (P.S.T.) in the Kharan Desert. This was a miniaturized device and latest design giving a yield, which was 60% of the first tests, i.e. 18-20 kilotonnes. A crater now takes the place of what used to be a small hillock in the rolling desert, marking the ground zero of the nuclear test there.

This article is an updated version of an article that was first published as a full-page feature in one of Pakistan’s national English daily newspapers, ‘The Nation’, from Islamabad, Lahore and Karachi, on 28 May 2000, to mark the second anniversary of Pakistan’s first nuclear test at Chagai, Balochistan. It has also been published by the Defence Journal (Karachi) in its June 2000 issue. This article has been quoted, cited and referred to in dozens of books, articles, research papers and publications around the world and has been recognized as the most detailed and accurate account of Pakistan's nuclear tests of May 1998.